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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103 (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its equitable division of the
marital estate when it denied Mr. Poll a share of certain real property located in Wasatch
County, Utah ("Wasatch Property") based on a specific factual finding that the Wasatch
Property was Ms. Straub's separate property and that the parties intended it to remain Ms.
Straub's separate property, and finding that Mr. Poll sought equitable relief with unclean
hands?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue as framed by Mr. Poll is a mixed question
because he implicitly asks this court to reverse the trial court's factual finding and to
reverse the trial court's equitable division of the marital estate. This presents a mixed
question of fact (whether the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub never intended to make
a gift of a one-half interest in the Wasatch Property was clearly erroneous), and a
question reviewed for an abuse of discretion (whether the trial court abused its discretion
in its equitable division of the marital estate).
First, Mr. Poll mounts a full frontal assault on a factual finding the trial court made
after hearing live testimony and considering all the evidence. Because Mr. Poll
challenges factual findings, he is required to marshal the evidence in support of the
challenged finding, and then demonstrate that the evidence on which the trial court relied
is legally insufficient to support the finding. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f20,
1

FN 5, 217 P.3d 733. To meet this burden, Mr. Poll must first assemble, in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every competent scrap of evidence that supports the challenged
finding. Id. at^[21 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct.App. 1991)). Mr. Poll must then demonstrate some "fatal flaw" in the
supportive evidence, and explain why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding. Id. at *p0, FN 5. Unless such a fatal flaw is identified, the finding will stand,
even if there is ample evidence in the record that would have supported a contrary
finding. Id. Accordingly, the starting point for this Court's analysis is a heavy
presumption in favor of the challenged findings. Id. The trial court's finding can only be
reversed if it is clearly erroneous. E.g., Ottens v. McNeil 2010 UT App 237, f 20, 239
P.3d308.
Second, Mr. Poll asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in its equitable
division of the marital estate. "A trial court has considerable discretion concerning
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of
validity." Kimball 2009 UT App at ^f 13. The trial court's division of the marital estate is
reviewed under the stringent abuse of discretion standard. Id. Such an abuse of
discretion is to be found only where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in serious or substantial error, where the evidence clearly
preponderates against the court's decision, or where such a serious inequity results as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For reference purposes, Ms. Straub refers to the following portions of the record
2

on appeal using the associated abbreviations:
•

Trial transcript, May 12, 2010:

TR. 1.

•

Trial transcript, May 13, 2010:

TR. 2.

•

Hearing transcript, May 18,2010:

TR. 3.

•

The court file:

R.

Mr. Poll's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts adequately demonstrates
that there is competent evidence, free from any fatal flaw, supporting the finding
presently challenged.
Specifically, the following facts presented in Mr. Poll's Statement of the Case
provide this Court a more than adequate basis to affirm the court below:
•

James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust Account
[which was undisputedly Ms. Straub's separate pre-marital funds], or Ms. Straub's
personal account. The only way he could receive funds from those was to ask Ms.
Straub to withdraw them and give them to him. TR. 1 at 80:11-81:7. In contrast,
the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their names on it and
had signing authority on it. TR. 1 at 84:6-19.

•

All $2.3 million used to purchase the Wasatch Property came from the Trust
Account. TR. 1 at 43:11-22, 91:24-93:22.

•

Ms. Straub testified that James' name was included on the deed because "[w]e
were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." TR.
1 at 44:11-12. She denied intending to make a gift to James of one half of the
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property. Id. at 44:13-15.
•

On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch Property to Sandra
Poll. TR. 1 at 46:3-11, 98:13-99:2; R. 324, Exhibit 4. The sole reason James gave
for divesting himself of the property was to prevent potential creditors from being
able to execute against the property. TR. 1 at 46:20-47:4, 99:21-100:7.

• Ms. Straub testified that the reason she did not ask James to deed the property
back to her earlier was because she was afraid of him, and because he had become
'physical55 on prior occasions. TR. 1 at 47:5-12.
• A mere 8 months after taking title as a joint tenant, James, of his own volition,
deeded the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub to protect it from potential
creditors. TR. 1 at 163:21-166:8.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Poll challenges a factual finding made by the district court after a bench trial.
Appellate courts grant significant deference to the trial court'sfindingsof fact in this
posture. Mr. Poll must first marshal the evidence, and if there is evidence to support the
finding, he must demonstrate a fatal legal flaw in the nexus between the evidence and the
finding. If thefindingis to be reversed, there must be a fatal flaw. Stated in the form of
a contrapositive, if there is no fatal flaw in the nexus between evidence and finding, the
finding must stand. Mr. Poll has not claimed that any such fatal legal flaw exists. His
sole contention is that the evidence does not support the finding. Because there is
substantial competent evidence to support the finding, the finding must stand.
The gravamen of Mr. Poll's arguments presented in his brief merely re-hash

arguments that have already been presented to, and rejected by, the district court. In the
absence of a showing that a finding was clearly erroneous, or a showing that the trial
court abused its discretion in its equitable division of the marital estate, this Court should
not undertake to second-guess the trial court because the trial court is in an advantaged
position to see the witnesses, judge their credibility and weigh the equities. Importantly,
after hearing both parties testify the trial court found Ms. Straub's testimony credible and
Mr. Poll's testimony to lack credibility. Mr. Poll has not presented adequate grounds for
this Court to second-guess the trial court's findings on this central point.
Finally, Mr. Poll misapprehends the import of the trial court's application of
unclean hands. The trial court did not conclude that Mr. Poll's conveying his interest in
the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub met the statutory elements of a fraudulent
transfer. Rather, the trial court, reasoning that the transfer might constitute a fraudulent
transfer, and relying on Mr. Poll's improper purpose in effecting the conveyance, found
that he came before a court of equity with unclean hands. The trial court was within the
bounds of its discretion when it relied on the doctrine of unclean hands in denying Mr.
Poll's claim to the Wasatch Property.
ARGUMENT
The real bone of contention in this appeal is the trial court's finding that Ms.
Straub never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch Property to Mr. Poll. This finding
was made after a bench trial where the trial court had a front row seat to an archetypal hesaid she-said dispute between divorcing spouses. The pivotal issue in this particular hesaid she-said battle: Ms. Straub's intent at the time she purchased the Wasatch Property.
5

After seeing both husband and wife testify en vivo, and considering all the other
evidence, the trial court made one key finding: that Ms. Straub never intended to make a
gift of the Wasatch Property to Mr. Poll. R. 338-36,fflf20-29. Central to the trial court's
finding was the finding that Mr. Poll's testimony was not credible and that Ms. Straub's
testimony was credible. Id. at 336, \ 27. Mr. Poll now asks this court to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses this court has not seen
testify, nor will it ever have opportunity to do so. Particularly where the trial court
identified other evidence that corroborated its finding on the issue of intent, Mr. Poll's
challenge to this factual finding must fail. Id. at 338-36,ffi[20-29.
Mr. Poll's primary challenge is to the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub never
intended to make the Wasatch Property part of the marital estate and that she intended to
keep it as her separate property. Before considering whether the trial court's finding was
clearly erroneous, it is important to understand why this finding of intent matters.
Mr. Poll claims that at the time the Wasatch Property was purchased, Ms. Straub's
intent was to make a gift to him of an undivided interest in the whole property. If an
interest in the Wasatch Property was gifted to Mr. Poll, it would have lost its separate
character and he might still have an equitable interest in the property, despite the
undisputed fact that he conveyed all legal title to it back to Ms. Straub a mere 7 months
later.
Litigants seeking to establish a gift must establish three elements: 1) a clear,
unmistakable intention on the donor's part to pass immediate ownership, 2) irrevocable
delivery, and 3) acceptance. Ross'Estate v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981). The
6

element in controversy here is the intent to pass immediate ownership. Indeed, Mr. Poll
concedes this: "More importantly, which of the two parties paid the bills during the
marriage is not a relevant consideration in determining whether Ms. Straub had the intent,
at the time, to contribute the Wasatch Property to the marital estate. This is the
controlling question

" Brief of Appellant at 44. The parties are in agreement that the

keystone question to this appeal is this: Was the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub did
not intend to gift an undivided one-half interest in the whole Wasatch Property to Mr.
Poll clearly erroneous? The trial court made detailed findings that she did not intend to
make a gift of the Wasatch Property, and identified the evidence it relied on in so finding.
R. 337-34,fflf25-35. Mr. Poll assails this finding.
1. THERE IS NO "FATAL FLAW" IN THE EVIDENCE THE DISTRICT
COURT RELIED ON WHEN IT FOUND THAT MS. STRAUB DID NOT
INTEND TO GIFT THE WASATCH PROPERTY INTO THE MARITAL
ESTATE.
Initially, Ms. Straub notes that Mr. Poll may not have adequately marshaled the
evidence that supports the finding. Indeed, in an appeal arising out of a bench trial where
the district court relies on live testimony in making its findings, marshalling may prove to
be a near practical impossibility because the district court has within its perception
factors that do not translate well into the record. Factors such as witness demeanor, body
language or other non-verbal cues that can influence a trial court's findings of credibility
and veracity are difficult, if not nearly impossible, to incorporate into the record. These
factors put the trial court in a uniquely advantaged position to judge the credibility of
witnesses. This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged this. See Hone v.
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Hone, 2004 UT App 241, Tf 5, 95 P.3d 1221 (citing Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, \ 2, 20
P.3d 332). Accordingly, this Court must give proper deference to the trial court's
assessment of credibility of the witnesses because this Court has no opportunity to see the
live testimony. Id.
However, even if Mr. Poll has met his marshaling burden, what is clear from the
portions of the record that Mr. Poll has assembled is that there is no fatal flaw in the
evidence supporting the finding. When one considers the evidence and the finding Mr.
Poll assails, it becomes apparent that this appeal amounts to little more than re-asserting
Mr. Poll's trial testimony, which the trial court found lacked credibility, and presenting
anew the same arguments the district court found unpersuasive.
a. The Standard of Review Requires that if Competent Evidence
Supports the Challenged Finding, The Finding Must Stand.
This Court has recently provided guidance on what the marshaling requirement
requires and what must be shown to satisfy the standard of review on a challenge to
factual findings. Kimball, 2009 UT App at f20, FN 5. To reverse the trial court's
finding, Mr. Poll must first satisfy the marshaling requirement and then show a fatal flaw
in the evidence supporting the finding. Id. The finding can only be reversed if there is a
fatal flaw. This is an exceptionally onerous burden.
To state the standard of review in the form of a contrapositive, if there is no fatal
flaw, the finding must stand. Stated yet another way, if there is competent evidence
supportive of the finding, the finding must stand. This iteration of the burden of proof is
conceptually easier to apply in the present case because Mr. Poll's sole challenge is that
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the evidence does not support the finding. In this case, if competent evidence supports
the finding, the trial court must be affirmed. This is true because Mr. Poll has not
asserted any other legal error in the nexus between the evidence and the challenged
finding. His sole challenge on appeal is that the evidence does not support the finding.
Again, this is an incredibly onerous burden to satisfy, and a burden that Mr. Poll cannot
meet on this record.
With this standard in mind, it is appropriate to start with a heavy presumption in
favor of the trial court's finding. See id. at ^f 13 (citing Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1,
Tf 6, 203 P.3d 1020). "After all, it is the trial court's singularly important mission to
consider and weigh all the conflicting evidence and find the facts. No matter what
contrary facts might have been found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial
court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires us to take the findings of fact as our
starting point, unless particular findings have been shown, in the course of an appellant's
meeting the marshaling requirement, to lack legally adequate evidentiary support." Id. at
120, FN 5.
b. Competent Evidence Supports The Finding.
Because there is evidence supporting the finding, this Court can only reverse the
trial court if Mr. Poll has demonstrated a "fatal flaw" in the nexus connecting the
evidence and the finding. Kimball, 2009 UT App at 120, FN 5. Such a "fatal flaw"
exists only where the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Id.
"Examples of such legal insufficiency include that testimony was later stricken by the
court; that a document was used for impeachment only and had not been admitted as
9

substantive evidence; that a document was not properly admitted because it did not
qualify under the business record exception to the hearsay rule; and that testimony that
seems to support a finding was recanted on cross-examination." Id.
While it is apparent that this list of examples is not an exhaustive itemization of
the fatal flaws that might arise, it is apparent that the type of flaw contemplated speaks to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding. Id. If the evidence is
substantive in nature, legally relevant to the finding and supportive thereof, and properly
admitted into evidence, and not susceptible to some other legal flaw, the finding must
stand. Id. ("The pill that is hard for many appellants to swallow is that if there is
evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal problem - a "fatal flaw" - with that
evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample evidence in the record that
might have supported contrary findings.").
Mr. Poll's Statement of Facts in his brief contains all the evidence this court needs
to uphold the trial court under the present standard of review. The following facts, as
stated in Mr. Poll's brief, support this finding:
•

James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust Account
[which was undisputedly Ms. Straub's separate pre-marital funds], or Ms. Straub's
personal account. The only way he could receive funds from those was to ask Ms.
Straub to withdraw them and give them to him. TR. 1 at 80:11-81:7. In contrast,
the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their names on it and
had signing authority on it. TR. 1 at 84:6-19.

•

All $2.3 million used to purchase the Wasatch Property came from the Trust
10

Account. TR.1 at 43:11-22, 91:24-93:22.
•

Ms. Straub testified that James' name was included on the deed because "[w]e
were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." TR.
1 at 44:11-12. She denied intending to make a gift to James of one half of the
property. Id. at 44:13-15.

•

On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch Property to Ms. Straub.
TR. 1 at 46:3-11, 98:13-99:2; R. 324, Exhibit 4. The sole reason James gave for
divesting himself of the property was to prevent potential creditors from being
able to execute against the property. TR. 1 at 46:20-47:4, 99:21-100:7.

•

Ms. Straub testified that the reason she did not ask James to deed the property
back to her earlier was because she was afraid of him, and because he had become
'physical" on prior occasions. TR. 1 at 47:5-12.

•

A mere 7 months after taking title as a joint tenant, James, of his own volition,
deeded the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub to protect it from potential
creditors. TR. 1 at 163:21-166:8.
Moreover, after hearing live testimony, the trial court found Ms. Straub's

testimony to be credible, and Mr. Poll's testimony to lack credibility on the critical issue
of Ms. Straub's intent when the Wasatch Property was purchased. R. 337-336,fflf24-29.
This finding is particularly critical because James' live testimony and Ms. Straub's live
testimony were in conflict on this point. After observing both witnesses and hearing
what each had to say, the trial court found Ms. Straub credible and James not credible.
Id.
11

There is no "fatal flaw" in the nexus between this evidence and the finding. All of
the above-identified evidence was admitted into evidence without objection. All such
evidence was substantive in nature, and not received for some other purpose. Moreover,
none of the testimonial evidence was recanted on cross. Finally, Mr. Poll has not
claimed that any other fatal flaw exists in the evidence supportive of the challenged
finding. His argument on appeal, summarized succinctly, is that the evidence in the
record would support a contrary finding. However, that such arguments must necessarily
fail is precisely the hard-to-swallow pill to which the Kimball court referred. Kimball
2009 UT App at 120, FN 5.
Moreover, this evidence supports the trial court's finding that James came before
the court with unclean hands in a similar manner to the litigants in Hone, 2004 UT App
241. 1 The trial court's finding that James' purpose in deeding the property back to Ms.
Straub was improper was properly based on the evidence before it. Likewise, denying

James also argues that the trial court found his deeding the property back to Ms. Straub
was a fraudulent transfer. James misapprehends the nature of the trial court's reasoning.
This point is taken up in more detail in Point 3. below.
2

Though Mr. Poll has not formally challenged the finding of unclean hands, his argument
against the trial court's analysis relying on the concept of a fraudulent conveyance relies,
in part, on a challenge to whether the trial court should have found that his motives were
improper. This is another challenge to a factual finding, which would require marshaling
the evidence. Mr. Poll has neither raised the issue, marshaled the evidence in favor of the
finding, nor adequately briefed this Court on the claimed fatal flaw in the supporting
evidence. For this reason, and because there is record evidence to support the finding,
this Court should assume that the finding is correct. E.g., Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v.
Comtrol Inc.,2001 UT App 407,ffif41-43, 175 P.3d 572, 580-81. Furthermore, the
record adequately demonstrates that such a finding was proper based on the evidence
before the trial court, as discussed in Point 3.a. below.
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equitable relief to a party found to have come before a court of equity with unclean hands
is well within the trial court's broad discretion.3 Hone, 2004 UT App at 111.
It is abundantly clear then, that competent evidence supports the finding. The
district court must be affirmed, unless Mr. Poll can demonstrate some other "fatal flaw55
in this evidence that demonstrates to this Court that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous. Mr. Poll has made no contention of any other flaw. This should not be
surprising, inasmuch as none exists. The trial court's finding must therefore be affirmed.
Finally, Ms. Straub notes that the Supreme Court has previously approached a
strikingly similar fact pattern in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).
There, Husband claimed a one-half interest in real property he claimed to be marital. Id.
Husband claimed the property became marital property because the home was held in
joint tenancy, evidencing an intent to make a gift of a one-half interest therein. Id. The

The question of whether the district court's application of the doctrine of unclean hands
to Mr. Poll was an abuse of discretion has not been properly raised or briefed, and this
Court need not address it. It is, however, apparent from the record that the application of
the doctrine of unclean hands here closely parallels its application in Hone, where this
Court found no abuse of discretion.
4

Also noteworthy is that Mr. Poll asks this court to find that Ms. Straub intended to make
a gift of the Wasatch Property. Brief of Appellant at 47. Mr. Poll bore the burden of
proving this fact by clear and convincing evidence to the trial court. Ross' Estate v. Ross,
626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981). It appears that appellate courts of this state have not
answered the question of whether an appellant requesting an appellate court to make its
own findings on factual issues that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence
below face an even more onerous burden than appellants challenging facts proven by a
preponderance below. Though this issue has not been raised directly in this appeal, it has
been raised tacitly. To the extent that this issue may be helpful to this Court, Ms. Straub
respectfully submits that because Mr. Poll seeks to establish a fact at the appellate level
by clear and convincing evidence, he necessarily faces an even more stringent burden
than an appellant challenging a fact proven by a preponderance below.
13

trial court found that there was no intent to make a gift of the home, and relying on this
finding, denied Husband an equitable share of the home. Id. This finding was upheld on
appeal because nothing in the record showed an abuse of discretion. Id.
2. MR. POLL MERELY RE-HASHES ARGUMENTS PROPERLY
REJECTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
The gravamen of Mr. Poll's arguments to the district court in favor of his factual
theory was that the Wasatch Property was gifted to him, converting the property to
marital property, which was undisputedly purchased with Ms. Straub's separate funds.
TR. at 198:1 - 201:2; R. at 300-299. As he argued before the trial court (R. at 300-299),
Mr. Poll argues again to this Court that Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah
1988) requires that the trial court must be reversed. However, on closer inspection,
Mortensen requires affirming the trial court, not reversing it. The Mortensen court stated
that separate property becomes marital property "when the acquiring spouse places title
in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property"
or "has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Id. at 308. The critical
inquiry is Ms. Straub's intent, as Mr. Poll recognizes. Brief of Appellant at 29. Further,
as Mr. Poll points out, this Court has previously stated that transferring otherwise
separate property into a joint tenancy, "when coupled with an evident intend to do so,
effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Bradford v.
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373,122, 993 P.2d 887 (emphasis added).
Neither Mortensen nor Bradford is helpful to Mr. Poll. This is because both
decisions focus on the intent of the donor at the time the property is acquired, or the gift
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is allegedly made. Here, the trial court made a specific finding that Ms. Straub had no
such donative intent. R. 337-336,fflf24-29. These findings took the court outside the
holding of Mortensen and Bradford because the requisite intent is not present here. The
trial court should therefore be affirmed.
Moreover, a review of the transcript of the trial and Mr. Poll's Trial Memorandum
discloses that he has already argued this factual theory to the trial court. TR. at 198:1 —
201:2; R. at 300-299. The trial court disagreed and made contrary findings based on a
specifically articulated evidentiary basis. R. 337-336,fflf24-28. This Court has
previously rejected attempts to reargue evidence presented to the trial court that ignore
factual support for the trial court's decision. See, e.g. Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282,
H 10, 76 P.3d 716; Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236,118, 9 P.3d 171. For similar
reasons, this Court should reject Mr. Poll's attempt to do the same thing.
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.
Because the trial court must be affirmed as explained above, this Court need not
reach the issue of the trial court's application of unclean hands. Nevertheless, in the
event that it is helpful to the Court, Ms. Straub explains here how the trial court was
within the bounds of its permissible discretion with its application of the doctrine of
unclean hands to the facts of this case.
a. Mr. Poll Misapprehends The Trial Court's Reliance on His Intent In
Conveying His Legal Interest to the Wasatch Property.
Mr. Poll misapprehends the nature of the trial court's reliance on the concept of a
fraudulent conveyance. Mr. Poll's argument is that the statutory elements of a fraudulent
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transfer have not been met in this case, and that the trial court therefore erred by finding
that a fraudulent transfer had taken place. The trouble with this analysis is that the trial
court never concluded a fraudulent transfer occurred. Indeed, the express language of the
trial court focused exclusively on Mr. Poll's intent, and made no mention of the other
statutory elements of a fraudulent transfer: "The court finds that it would not be
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially
fraudulent conveyance." R. 336,129.
The trial court's analysis proceeded thus: It is beyond dispute that Mr. Poll
conveyed all legal interest he might have had in the property to Ms. Straub. He therefore
has no legal claim to the Wasatch Property. His only claim to it would be an equitable
claim. Mr. Poll argued that Ms. Straub intended to make a gift of the Wasatch Property
by giving him an undivided interest in the whole as a joint tenant with rights of
survivorship. Mr. Poll's assertion of an equitable interest in the Wasatch Property rests
entirely on two facts: 1) his claim that the parties intended that an undivided interest in
the whole of the Wasatch Property to be a gift to him;5 and 2) his claim that the real
purpose behind his transferring the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub was to shield it
from creditors, and not to disclaim any interest in it he might have.
The trial court found these claims to lack credibility. R. at 337-335,fflf24-34.

5

It is also important to note that the elements of gift must also be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Ross' Estate, 626 P.2d at 491. This also has the effect of
increasing the already heavy burden Mr. Poll faces in his request that this Court reverse
the trial court's factual findings and application of the doctrine of unclean hands, and
instruct the trial court to enter factual findings found by clear and convincing evidence by
a reviewing court.
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The trial court found that Ms. Straub never intended to make a gift of the property, but
that the parties intended it to remain her separate property. Id. at 338, ^ 27. The trial
court then found that Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the property back to Ms.
Straub was an improper one. Id. at 336,129. The court found that "it would not be
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially
fraudulent conveyance... The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not include
the Wasatch County property and that it would be the separate property of Mrs. Poll.
However, now he seeks before a court of equity to claim a one-half interest in the
property." Id.
It is apparent then, that the court did not rely on a finding that the statutory
elements of a fraudulent transfer had occurred. Rather, this portion of the court's analysis
relied on its application of the doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, the court found
that because Mr. Poll's intent was improper, he would not be heard to seek equitable
relief. This is further evidenced by the trial court's citing to this Court's decision in
Hone, 2004 UT App 241 for the proposition that a party that comes before a court of
equity with unclean hands is not entitled to equitable relief. R. 336-35, ^} 30-33. There
is nothing new about the doctrine of unclean hands and the maxim that he who seeks
equity must do equity. See e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Stiffler, 48 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1935)
("A court of equity is a court of conscience, and anyone appealing to or asking the aid of
such court should come into it with clean hands and be willing to do equity... Likewise,
anyone who seeks equity must be willing to do equity") (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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The trial court's application of the doctrine of unclean hands squares perfectly
with how it has always been applied. Shell Oil Co., 48 P.2d at 509. The critical finding
for purposes of the trial court's unclean hands analysis is that Mr. Poll's intent at the time
he conveyed his legal interest back to Ms. Straub was improper and, as such, he was
found to have sought equitable relief with unclean hands. The trial court appropriately
denied his request. R. 336, ^[29; Hone, 2004 UT App at f 9. Mr. Poll's analysis of
whether or not the statutory elements of a fraudulent transfer were met therefore not only
misapprehends the trial court's analysis, it is a red herring.
b. Mr. Poll's Attempt To Distinguish This Case From Hone Is Unavailing.
Mr. Poll argues that the present case is distinguishable from Hone. His argument
is that in Hone, one of the parties seeking equitable relief was found to have deceived
Medicaid, while in the present case there was no creditor deceived by his transfer of the
property back to Ms. Straub. Brief of Appellant at 40. This is a distinction without
significance. The Hone court relied on the notion that a party seeking equitable relief
must not come before a court of equity with unclean hands. Hone, 2004 UT App at ^f 7.
Here, the trial court found that the transfer of the Wasatch Property out of Mr.
Poll's hands was for an improper purpose. R. 335,133. It is of no moment that there
was not a specifically identified creditor as there was in Hone. The critical question is
whether the party seeking equity has done equity. Hone, 2004 UT App at % 7. Mr. Poll's
attempt to distinguish these facts from the facts of Hone fails to identify a meaningful
distinction between the two cases. In both cases, the trial court relied on the improper
conduct of the party seeking equitable relief in denying such relief. This Court should
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affirm the trial court's application of unclean hands just as it did in Hone.
4. THE REMAINDER OF MR. POLL'S ANALYSIS AMOUNTS TO REARGUING FACTUAL THEORIES REJECTED BELOW IN THE HOPE
THAT THIS COURT WILL RE-WEIGH THE EQUITIES AND FIND
THEM IN HIS FAVOR.
The remainder of Mr. Poll's analysis amounts to re-arguing his version facts in an
attempt to get this Court to re-weigh the equities and make its own equitable division of
the marital estate. Brief of Appellant at 47 ("James asks this Court to reverse the
decision of the trial court, hold that the Wasatch County Property was marital property
and hold that he is entitled to a one-half interest therein.55). By making this request, Mr.
Poll asks this Court to usurp "the singularly important mission [of the trial court] to
consider and weigh all the conflicting evidence and find the facts.55 Kimball 2009 UT
App at Tf 20, FN 5. While there are rare circumstances where this Court can do so, Mr.
Poll has not made a showing that any of those circumstances exist in this case. Rather, he
argues that Ms. Straub5s conduct was more inequitable than Mr. Poll's,6 makes a public
policy argument, and re-argues the equities in this case.
Regarding the first argument that Ms. Straub5s conduct was more inequitable than
Mr. Poll's because she knew that the purpose of the transfer was to shield the Wasatch
Property from creditors, the trial court made a factual finding to the contrary that finds
substantial support in the record. R. 337-36,fflf26-29. The evidence cited by the trial
Mr. Poll appears to have conceded that his conduct was inequitable in making one such
argument: "Ms. Straub5s inequitable conduct, however, was more extensive than James
because she was willing to defraud James as well.55 Brief of Appellant at 38. While Ms.
Straub and the trial court both disagree with Mr. Poll's accusation against her, it does
appear to be a tacit acknowledgment that his conduct was inequitable, which only
bolsters the trial court's application of unclean hands.
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court more than amply supports the finding, which is a sufficient basis for affirming.
Kimball 2009 UT App at f 20, FN 5 ("No matter what contrary facts might have been
found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as factfinder requires us to take the findings of fact as our starting point, unless particular
findings have been shown, in the course of an appellant's meeting the marshalling
requirement, to lack legally adequate evidentiary support."). Moreover, the critical
inquiry here, as far as unclean hands is concerned, is not what Ms. Straub knew or did not
know regarding Mr. Poll's intent in conveying the property back to her; the critical
inquiry is Mr. Poll's intent at the time he conveyed the property back to her. See Hone,
2004UTAppat1fll.
Mr. Poll's public policy argument falls well wide of the mark. First, his
hypothetical presented at page 41 is distinguishable from the present facts in one key
regard. Mr. Poll raises the possibility of an unscrupulous spouse A convincing spouse B
to transfer marital property to spouse A individually. Spouse A then files for divorce and
claims that it was spouse B's intent to sequester the property from creditors. Spouse A
then claims that spouse B had unclean hands and should be denied the opportunity to
claim an equitable share of the property because of B's inequitable conduct. Brief of
Appellant at 41. The problem with this hypothetical is that it does not mirror the facts
here. Ms. Straub did nothing to convince Mr. Poll to convey his interest to the Wasatch
Property, for which she paid $2.3 million, back to her. It was his idea. Brief of
Appellant at 34-35; TR. 1 at 46:3-47:4; 99:13-100:7. The hypothetical is not helpful to
the court because it is distinguishable.
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But perhaps more glaring is that this Court need not be concerned with the policy
implications of its decision in this case. If this Court affirms, the trial court's
discretionary decision is not binding on any other trial court approaching an equitable
division of a marital estate. Those trial courts will enjoy the same broad discretion in
making property divisions as the equities of those cases require in the same way that the
trial court enjoyed the same broad discretion to make such divisions as the equities in this
case required. E.g., Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 273 (UT.Ct.App 1993). Further,
district courts will enjoy even more flexibility in making factual findings in support of
their equitable division. Kimball, 2004 UT App at \ 20, FN 5. The district court will be
free to make factual findings so long as the findings are supported by the evidence, and
weigh the equities of the case and divide marital estates as appropriate, as long as their
division falls within their broad permissible discretion. Affirming the trial court here
simply will not open the floodgates as Mr. Poll claims. Thus, Mr. Poll's public policy
argument is unpersuasive because the decision of this case will not form binding
precedent on trial courts of the state as Mr. Poll would have this Court believe it will.
The only policy this Court should entertain is the long-standing policy that
appellate courts of this state grant trial courts broad discretion in making such findings
and equitable decisions. See id. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the
credibility of all the conflicting evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, make factual
findings on this evidence, weigh the equities and proceed accordingly. Id. This is
particularly true where, as here, a substantial portion of the evidence on which the trial
court relied comes in the form of live testimony, which is rife with non-verbal cues that
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typically find no voice in the cold record. Appellate courts should not assume the role of
a Monday morning quarterback in matters such as are involved in this appeal unless there
is a compelling reason to do so. Such a compelling reason can be found only when an
appellant has adequately marshaled the evidence and ferreted out a fatal flaw in the trial
court's factual finding. Id. at f 21 (citing West Valley City 818 P.2d at 1315). Mr. Poll
has failed to do so here. The policy of deference therefore requires affirming the trial
court.
Finally, Mr. Poll contends that there are no equitable grounds to justify denying
him a share of the Wasatch Property. Brief of Appellant at 42-47. First, the primary
grounds on which the trial court relied in denying him a share of the Wasatch Property
was that the Wasatch Property is Ms. Straub's separate property. R. 337-35,fflf24-29.
That being the case, this argument is wide of the mark. The trial court found that Ms.
Straub did not intend to make a gift of an interest in the Wasatch Property, which is to
say that it remained her separate property. Even if this Court adopted wholesale Mr.
Poll's view of the equities, he has no claim to her separate property. Hodge v. Hodge,
2007 UT App 394,15, 174 P.3d 1137.
Further, even if this Court were to look past this flaw, Mr. Poll's arguments must
fail because he has not shown that the trial court has exceeded the bounds of its
permissible discretion. His argument, summarized simply, is that the trial court should
have given more weight to the evidence that favored Mr. Poll than it did. At no point
does he even attempt to show how the trial court abused its discretion. Given the level of
deference afforded trial courts in this posture, in the absence of even a facial attempt to
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show that the trial court abused its discretion, it must be assumed that the trial court did
not, and should therefore be affirmed. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, *{ 10.
CONCLUSION
Even if Mr. Poll has adequately surveyed the record for every scrap of evidence
supporting the challenged finding, he has failed to ferret out a fatal flaw in the nexus
between the supporting evidence and the finding he contests. Moreover, there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the contested finding. Additionally, the
trial court specifically found Mr. Poll to be not credible on the pivotal issue here. His
challenge must therefore fail. Simply re-arguing factual and equitable theories that were
made to, and rejected by, the trial court does not justify reversing the trial court.
Mr. Poll also misapprehends the trial court's application of the doctrine of unclean
hands. The trial court's application of unclean hands was also proper, and provides this
Court another basis on which it can rely in affirming the result below that Mr. Poll
contests.
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court should be affirmed.
FfeaeuAfy
Respectfully submitted on this, the */m day of-fanuary,2011.
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